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I
INTRODUCTION
There are two principal aspects of conflict avoidance: one involves the care and
foresight of astute counsel who, knowing the rules of law, or perhaps the confusion
of rules, in a given area, advises clients and draws documents so as to minimize the
likelihood of a conflict of laws; the other, apparently not of great interest to Anglo-
American lawyers and scholars, involves the minimization of the conflict of laws
by legislation directed specifically at the problem. Ideally, this latter aspect aims
not so much at the avoidance of conflicts, which are implicit in a community com-
prised of many separate jurisdictions, but rather at so precise and lucid a delineation
of conflicts rules that attorneys, in counseling and drafting, will be able to act with
reasonable certainty and confidence. Actually, of course, legislative reaction to the
conflict of laws has consisted principally of ignoring the problem and consigning to
the judiciary the essentially legislative function of fashioning appropriate rules; and,
as a result, there have been superadded to the inevitable conflicts between the in-
ternal laws of different jurisdictions conflicts between the rules of the various juris-
dictions for resolving conflicts of laws Accordingly, this article will rather concern
itself primarily with conflict avoidance in inter vivos trusts of movables in the
light of existing rules, or the confusion over what the existing rules are; and only
to a limited extent will it consider conflict avoidance in this field by legislative means,
which, as a matter of fact, cannot be isolated from the larger problem of general
conflicts legislation.2
The trusts which will be considered are the bankers' "living trusts," the lawyers'
"trusts inter vivos," and not the testamentary trusts, which are more appropriate to
"Conflict Avoidance in Succession Planning."' Attention will be concentrated on
the conflict of laws of the United States simply because most of the material available
relates thereto. Avoidance of the conflict of tax laws will not be discussed-the topic
*A.B. '937, Harvard College; J.D. 1940, University of Chicago Law School; M.B.A. 1947, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University. Member of the New York and, District of
Columbia bars; Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, since 1953. Author, Conflict of Laws, in
1947-1954 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW; and JmSDICTsoN TO ENFORCE WIFE'S RIGHT TO
SUPPORT NOTWITHSTANDING FOREIGN DIVORCE ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT (N. Y. Law
Rev. Comm'n, Legis. Doc. No. 65(K) (1953)). Contributor to legal periodicals.
' See Dean, The Conflict of Conflict of Laws, 3 STAN. L. REV. 388 (1951).
2Id. at 401 et seq.; ELLIOTr E. CH ATAma, NOEL T. DOWLING, HERBERT F. GOODRICH, ERWIN N.
GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICt OF LAWS 649-57 (2d ed. 194r); cf. Nussbaum, Sources
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has come to be one for the tax expert-nor will the conflict over jurisdiction be
treated.5 The type of trust to be examined will be the express trust, ordinarily for
family settlement, and will not include charitable trusts, business insurance trusts,
investment trusts, community trusts, or trusts in connection with corporate mort-
gages, to mention some of the many other possibilities.
By "trust," of course, reference is made to that remarkable institution peculiar to
Anglo-American law consisting of'
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it;
the parties to which have been described in these words :7
(i) The person who creates a trust is the settlor.
(2) The property held in trust is the trust property.
(3) The person holding property in trust is the trustee.
(4) The person for whose benefit property is held in trust is the beneficiary.
The classification of property as "movable" or "immovable" is peculiar to the
conflict of laws and avoids many of the difficulties inherent in the similar, but not
identical, classifications of "personalty" and "realty."' For the purposes of the con-
flict of laws, immovables include all interests in land and whatever is attached perma-
nently thereto, while movables include all other varieties of property. Although
movables are typically tangible articles, such tangibles are rarely conveyed in trust
by settlors; it is rather intangible property, such as corporate securities, government
bonds, and the like, of which trusts of movables are generally comprised. While
some securities, such as negotiable instruments, are usually treated as tangibles be-
cause the property right is said to be embodied in the document describing it, prop-
erty having a documentary, as distinguished from an immediate physical, existence
will be considered intangible in the discussion to follow.
II
CONFLICT AVOIDANCE
A. The Creation of Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables
There are two essential requirements for conflict avoidance by counsel: the first,
of course, is that counsel shall be knowledgeable and careful; the second is that there
be a coherent body of rules from which he can derive guidance. With respect to the
conflict rules governing the creation of inter vivos trusts of movables, there is a
' "For the time being . . . jurisdiction to tax parts company with general conflict of laws problems."
ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM, NOEL T. DOWLING, HERBERT F. GOODRICH, ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 113 (1947 Supp.)
See WALTER IV. LAND, TRusTs IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS C. 8 (1940).
"RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §2 (1935).
tId. §3.
"See In re Berchtold, [1923] 1 Ch. 192; WALTER W. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 12 (1942).
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wide gamut of authoritative statement, once we pass the threshold of formal
validity.
To begin with, Professor Beale tersely stated that "... the law of the situs of a
chattel determines its transfer inter vivos,"9 and "there is no reason why this general
rule should not be applied to the transfer of chattels into the hands of a trustee.""
Furthermore,"
A sale or gift of money or securities is governed by the law of the place where the
money is deposited or the cash or securities are kept at the time of the sale or gift, and
not at the domicil of the owner.
This is equally true, both on principle and on authority, of a gift of money or securities
in trust.
A few years later, he observed that"
• . . the question of the validity of a trust of securities has come up, and it has been
decided that its validity is governed by the law of the situs of the securities ... the only
authority to the contrary is an ill-considered dictum.-. . . The law governing the validity
of a trust of intangibles [i.e., other than "securities"] cannot be stated with confidence.
Reflecting Professor Beale's general assurance is the Restatement:'
3
The validity of a trust of choses in action created by a settlement or other transaction
inter vivos is determined by the law of the place where the transaction takes place.
Comment f. When claim embodied in document. If a chose in action is evidenced
by a document in which, by the law of the state where it was issued, the title to the
obligation is embodied, a transaction purporting to create a trust therein is governed by the
law of the state where the document is at the time of the transaction.
Unfortunately for the Restatement, however, Professor Cavers undermined its
whole approach to inter vivos trusts of movables in an examination of its Tentative
Draft in which he observed :14
But if we expect to find in the cases the clear-cut, if complex, process which the Restate-
ment rule suggests, that expectation will be disappointed. Decisions frequently cited turn
out only too often to be dicta, but even these may not be disregarded where square holdings
are rarities.
As to what the courts actually are doing when faced with a challenge to the validity
of a trust, a question as to whether, in fact, a trust has been created, Professor Cavers
concluded:"5
'Beale, Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws, 45 Htmv. L. REv. 969, 970 (1932).
lIbid. See also 2 JoSEPH H. BE.ALE, A TREAT5sE oN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IOI8 (1935). No
doubt seems to exist as to the law governing the creation of an inter vivos trust of movable chattels,
so this topic will not be further pursued.
" Beale, supra note 9, at 970-71.
12 BEALE, op. ct. supra note io, at zog-2o.
RE TATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §294(2) 0934)-
'Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 Ht.v. L. RFv. 161, 174-75 (931).
"Id. at 19i; cf. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (I933); In re Jarvie's Trust,
73 N. Y. S. 2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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There is a weighing of various considerations-domicil, situs, place of execution, place
of administration, form of instrument-a vague evaluation on the basis of which the
court finds the law of one jurisdiction or another the proper law or the intended law.
One cannot blind oneself to the weight placed on the intent of the settlor with reference
to the selection of the governing law.
Judge Goodrich, in the latest edition of his text on the conflict of laws, states
firmly in black letters: "The validity of . . . a trust crea[t]ed inter vivos [is de-
termined] by the law of the situs of the property";"0 but after discussing several
important cases, he concludes with less assurance: "If these cases may be considered
typical, it would appear that no single rule of reference can be laid down for de-
termining the validity of trusts inter vivos."' 7
Professor Stumberg is more cautious in his black-letter comment:"8
It has been held that the valid creation of a trust inter vivos is a matter for the law at the
situs, whether the subject matter is land or personalty.
In the discussion that follows, he adds that ". . . there is considerable confusion
in the cases dealing with the creation of a trust inter vivos of movable property"1
and then goes on:20
The growing practice of creating trusts inter vivos makes it exceedingly important
that some satisfactory rule be determined upon and applied generally so that settlors may
be adequately advised in advance as to the legal effect of contemplated trust instruments.
Advice of counsel is habitually sought in trust transactions, but with the present state
of the authorities, such advice frequently cannot be given with certainty.
Another writer, after enumerating the interstate factors weighed by courts in
passing on the validity of inter vivos trusts of movables, selected as ". . . two of the
most important factors . . . the domicil of the creator and place of execution of the
trust. "21
Nor are the treatises on trusts very helpful on the conflict of laws. Scott's index
does not reveal any reference to the conflict of laws concerning the creation or
validity of any type of trust.2 2 Bogert states that ".... while in general the ... legality
of a trust of personalty [has been determined] by the law of the settlor's domicile,
there are many opportunities for complication and variation,""8 and then briefly enu-
merates the elements that have influenced different courts in passing on the validity
of trusts. In Perry, we learn that "the general rule, that the validity of an attempted
trust is to be determined by the law.., of the domicile of the donor ... if the prop-
"HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 490 (3d ed. 1949).
" Id. at 492.
18 GEORGE V. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 431 (2d ed. 5951).
" Id. at 433-
20 Ibid.
"1 Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of Personal Property,
45 YALE L. J.. 438, 449 (1935). Sce also MAYO A. SHATTUCK, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 330.34
(1948); Note, Trusts of Personalty and Conflict of Laws, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 360 ('941).
224 AuSTIN W. Scor, THE LAw OF TRUSTs 2839 (0939).
23 rA GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 327 (1951).
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erty consists of personalty, is subject to considerable qualification . . .,"24 which is
then discussed in less than two pages. And Nossaman summarizes his short section
on the subject in these words:25
The law of the situs-that is, of the state of residence of the trustee--ordinarily
governs the validity of inter vivos trusts. But the intent of the parties that the law of
the domicile should govern will be applied to a rather indeterminate extent....
The most comprehensive examination of the authorities on the conflict of laws
in the creation of inter vivos trusts of movables was undertaken by the late Walter
W. Land in 194 o, and he thus summarized the situation as it then appeared :26
In New York and New Jersey, although the domicil of the settlor was formerly accorded
particular importance and in some cases furnished the governing law, recent decisions
have transferred this emphasis from the settlor's domicil to the location of the trust prop-
erty. Other elements of the trust are also considered, as the place where the trust instru-
ment was executed, the domicil of the trustee, and the place in which the business of the
trust is carried on. In the scattered opinions in states other than New York and New
Jersey, apparently the domicil of the settlor is still considered of somewhat greater im-
portance than any other single factor of the trust, although it will be outweighed by the
remaining factors coinciding in another state. In all of the states which have passed on
the question, an express intent of the settlor as to the governing law, combined with one
or more important elements of the trust in the state selected, has caused the internal law
of the designated state to govern.
The case law since 194o has not produced any startling changes, but rather
exhibits a continuation of the trend that Land described. Recent decisions have given
effect to stipulations in the indenture as to the governing law,2 7 and others have
discerned an implied intent as to the governing law by weighing the distribution of
the elements of the trust.2 s Nevertheless, there are still courts that apply somewhat
mechanically the law of the situs of the trust29 or the law of the domicile of the
settlor. 0  What makes all such summaries misleading, however, is the persistence
of the courts in mentioning alternative bases for the choice of law, which introduces
confusion as to the test actually employed-a strict implied intent or the place of pre-
dominant contacts.
:x JAIRUS W. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRUSTEES §72a (7th ed., Baldes
1929).
25W1ALTER A. NossAmAN, TRusT ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATiON 120 (2945).
2ILAND, op. citi. supra note 5, at iog. Because of the careful and comprehensive analysis of the
inter vivos trust cases up to 1940 in Land, cases cited hereafter will be principally those decided since
1940.
"
7 E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N. E. 2d. 337 (195o); Haase v.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 295 N. Y. 761, 66 N. E. 2d 126 (1946); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Meyn, 263 App. Div. 672, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 373 (2d Dep't 2942).
" E.g., In re Davis' Trust, 233 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Application of Eyre, 133 N. Y. S. 2d
5ri (Sup. Ct. 1954); In re Griswold's Trust, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (Sup. Ct. i95o); In re O'Connor,
82 N. Y. S. 2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1948); First Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, 73 N. E. 2d 388 (C. P. Ohio
1947).
' E.g., Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 26o F. 2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947); In re Piazza's Estate,
130 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
'0 E.g., David v. Atlantic Society, 129 N. J. Eq. 896, i9 A. 2d 896 (194).
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Of course, the simplest way to avoid a conflict of laws over the validity of an
inter vivos trust of movables is to plan it so that it has no substantial connection with
more than a single state. If the settlor is domiciled in state X, have him execute the
indenture there, select a trustee to administer the trust there, assemble the corpus
of the trust there, deliver it to the trustee there, etc. A conflict of laws affecting
such a trust, then, will be likely to arise only in the event that the trust is moved
elsewhere.
There is also considerable support in the cases for the proposition that counsel
drafting the indenture for an inter vivos trust of movables can select the law by
which the validity of the trust shall be determined, 31 provided the law is that of a
jurisdiction which has connection with at least some element of the trust 2 While
this can be done with respect to many trust matters where the law of a given juris-
diction is deemed preferable to that which would otherwise apply, it should be noted
that if public policy would thereby be subverted, the expression of intent may be
ignored
3
The New York Personal Property Law seems specifically to recognize and give
effect to the expressed intent of the settlor in these matters :34
Whenever a person being a citizen of the United States, or a citizen or a subject of
a foreign country, wherever resident, creates a trust of personal property situated within
this state at the time of the creation thereof, or of which the trustee is a resident of this
state, or a domestic corporation or national bank located within this state, duly authorized
by law to act as trustee, and declares in the instrument creating such trust that it shall
be construed and regulated by the laws of this state, the validity and effect of such trust
shall be determined by such laws.
Therefore, to paraphrase slightly a clause in use in one law office in New York City,
a draftsman in New York might insert the following in the indenture :"
I hereby direct, in accordance with Section i2-a of the Personal Property Law of the
State of New York, that the validity and effect of the dispositions in trust made by me
herein shall be determined by the Laws of the State of New York.
Another suggested clause, for more general use, is:30;
The validity, construction, effect and administration of this agreement shall be gov-
erned and determined under the laws of the State of [e.g., New York].
"E.g., Kitchen v. New York Trust Co., 292 Ky. 7o6, 168 S. W. 2d 5 (1943); Shannon v. Irving
Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. 2d 792 (1937); see also cases cited note 27, supra.
"Eg., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cheek, 93 N. Y. L. J. 2941, June 7, 1935 (N. Y. Sup. CtO).
"E.g., Matter of Adriance, 158 Misc. 857, 286 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1936) (testamentary
trust; public policy against perpetuities; additional facts stated in LAND, Op. cit. supra note 5, at ii9).
But see, e.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. 2d 79Z (1937); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Cheek, iio N Y. S. 2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 1952); and Note, Use of a Foreign Trust to
Avoid the New York Rule Against Perpetiies, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 247 (1955).
" N. Y. PERS. PR0p. LAW § i2-a. Cf. In re Ash's Trust, six N. Y. S. ad 115 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
See also R. I. GENz. LAws c. 486 (1938), as amended by R. I. Acts & Resolves 1941, c. 977, adding new
§23, 24.
"Swabenland, supra note as, at 451.
"0 LAND, op. ct. supra note 5, at 124.
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Even where the indenture contains no express direction as to which law is to
govern the trust, however, a number of courts have effectuated the implied intent of
the settlor as inferred from the indenture and the circumstances surrounding the
trust. As one court put it, "Here there is no express declaration of intention, but the
intention is implied in every act and word of the parties."' 7 In any event, where
it is inexpedient specifically to express an intent as to the law governing a trust,
counsel may still strongly influence a court in its determination of the proper law by
grouping as many of the elements of the trust as possible in the desired state.
Where these conflict avoidance techniques have not been employed in drafting
the indenture, however, a thorough investigation of the cases up to 1940 led Land to
conclude that'
... after a trust has been created . . it is no longer possible to plan the law to govern.
The only contrary cases he found were a group of New York decisions in which
appointment of a New York trust to an extrastate charity was upheld under the law
of the second state even though it would have been invalid under New York law.39
Since 194o, however, there have been indications that even after its creation,
counsel may so shift the location of the important elements of a trust that its validity
will be determined by the law of another state. The leading case in point is Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co.,40 which involved an inter vivos trust
of movables established in New York by a New York domiciliary. The indenture
provided that a majority of the adult beneficiaries, with the approval of the settlor,
if still living, could change the trustee. After a number of years, in place of the
New York trustee, a Delaware bank was appointed trustee, and the corpus of the
trust was transferred to Delaware. The instant litigation turned on whether New
York or Delaware law governed the validity of the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment under the indenture, 4' and the court held that the trust had properly been
transformed from a New York into a Delaware trust and that Delaware law thence-
forth governed its validity and powers granted under it.
An even more peregrinating trust was considered in a North Carolina case in
the same year4 Plaintiff, as settlor and life beneficiary, established an inter vivos
trust of movables, possibly in England. Later, she amended the indenture and trans-
ferred the corpus to an Illinois bank as trustee, waiving, at the same time, the right
to revoke which the indenture contained. Subsequently, she became a resident of
"Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 395, i87 N. E. 65, 71 (1933), i9 CORNELL L. Q. 282 (1934);
accord, National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 9x N. E. 2d 337 (x950). See also cases
cited note 28 supra.
as LAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13o.
"°E.g., Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (i9o6); Manice v.
Manice, 43 N. Y. 303 (1871) (testamentary trust). See also Curtis v. Curtis, x85 App. Div. 391, 173
N. Y. Supp. 103 (ist Dep't x8).
40 24 A. 2d 309 (Del. 1942), 30 GEO. L. J. 788 (1942).
" On conflict of laws problems peculiar to powers of appointment, see Casner, Estate Planning-
Powers of Appointment, 64 HAntv. L. REv. 185, 2o8-io (1950).
"2 MacMillan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 221 N. C. 352, 205 S. E. 2d 276 (942).
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North Carolina and appointed as trustee a North Carolina bank, which balked when
she thereafter sought to terminate the trust with the consent of the remainderman.
To the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the case seemed to present no serious
difficulties: it noted that the settlor and life beneficiary had become a North Carolina
resident, that a North Carolina bank had become the trustee, and that the situs
of the trust was in North Carolina, and, accordingly, it applied a North Carolina
statute on termination of trusts, without any consideration of the effect of the prior
waiver under Illinois law.
A Pennsylvania case in the following year, although couched in terms of juris-
diction rather than the validity of the trust involved, did grant the beneficiary's pe-
tition to accept the resignation of the original trustee in Delaware and to appoint
a Pennsylvania trustee instead 3  The decision emphasized the many connections
the trust had always had with Pennsylvania, however, so it is not as strong a holding
as the above two cases 4
While it cannot be said that changes in the distribution of the elements of the
trust among various states will necessarily vary the governing law,45 it would, never-
theless, seem prudent to insert in the indenture a clause authorizing a change in the
situs of the trust for good reasons. And in effecting such a change in situs for an
existing trust, it would also be desirable for counsel to cancel any designation of a
local agent to accept service of process and to cancel likewise any undertakings to
account to a local court 6
B. The Construction of Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables
"Construction" of inter vivos trusts of movables here refers not to the legal
effect of words used in the indenture, but rather to the meaning of the words47
In this connection, if the court has sufficient information, it will infer therefrom the
intent of the parties; but if such information is not available, it will, of necessity,
have to rely on presumptions as to what was intended. Because the cases fail to
distinguish nicely between such "interpretation" and resort to presumptions, both
processes are here embraced by the term "construction."4 s
Professor Beale initially did not recognize any distinction between the construc-
tion of an indenture and the administration of a trust, flatly asserting that "any ques-
"'Appeal of Schoble, 346 Pa. 318, 30 A. 2d 316 (943).
" Other recent cases on change of situs include In re Griswold's Trust, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (Sup. Ct.
i95o); Application of New York Trust Co., 1g5 Misc. 598, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949) and
Matter of Shipman, 179 Misc. 303, 4o N. Y. S. 2d 373 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
" The persistence of the traditional view that the validity of an inter vivos trust of movables will
be governed always by the law applicable at its creation is illustrated by David v. Atlantic County
Society, 129 N. J. Eq. 501, 59 A.2d 896 (1941).
"sSee Capron, Situs of Trusts in Conflict of Laws, 93 TRusTS & EsTATEs 878 (1954).
"7 REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §296 (1934). See, e.g., Goodrich, J., in Robinson v. Chance,
213 F. 2d 834 (3d Cir. 1954)..
'" See REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §214, comments b, c (1934).
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tion which arises after the trust has come into being is a question of the administra-
tion of the trust,"49 and concluding that 0
All matters of administration are determined by the law of the situs or seat of the
trust. The situs of a trust must be determined by an interpretation of the words by which
the trust is created. No rule of law can be laid down for the purpose of interpretation.
All indications are considered, such as the intention of the parties, the place of business or
domicil of the trustee, the location of the trust res, and other similar factors.
Later, however, he admitted this qualification:1
The interpretation of an instrument creating a trust of personalty is, in the absence of
strong inference to the contrary, to be made according to the usage of the domicil of the
settlor.
The Restatement, it will be no surprise to discover, takes much the same view,
with an added reference to the time element:52
The meaning of the words used in an instrument creating a trust of movables is, in
the absence of controlling circumstances to the contrary, determined in accordance with
usage at the domicil of the settlor of the trust at the time of the execution of the instru-
ment which created it.
Professor Cavers, however, reached quite different conclusions :5
It is submitted, therefore, that (i) an express declaration of intention as to the law
desired by the settlor to govern his trust may properly be respected where the state whose
law is so designated has a substantial connection with the transaction. (2) Where there
is no such express declaration, the court should examine the facts of the transaction and
the circumstances surrounding it in an effort to ascertain and effectuate any intent which
is inferable therefrom. (3) In a wholly colorless transaction the law of the place of
administration of the trust should be applied.
To Judge *Goodrich, like Professor Beale, all questions arising after the creation
of a trust ". . . are those concerning the administration of the trust,""4 and "such
matters are generally said to be governed by the law of the place where the trust is
to be administered."5 Professor Stumberg seems to take the same view.5
Walter W. Land, however, found in the cases support for the view that the con-
struction of a trust agreement is distinguishable from the administration of the
trust. He concluded that in construing the language of an inter vivos trust of
"' Beale, supra note 9, at 972. See also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRuSTS 366 (2d ed.
1947).
" Beale, supra note 9, at 972.
a1 2 BEALE, Op. cit. supra note io, at 1023.
52 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 296 (1934). Cf. McGrath v. Ward, 91 F. Supp. 636 (D. Mass.
1950).
" Cavers, supra note 14, at 195. Cf. In re Cheney's Estate, io9 N. Y. S. 2d 704 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(settlor specified law to govern construction); Minot v. Minot, 319 Mass. 253, 66 N. E. 2d 5 (1946)
(only trustee and res in New York; New York law applied).
"' GoODRIcs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 492.
" Id. at 493. Accord, Noble v. Rogan, 49 F. Supp. 370 (S. D. Calif. 1943).
"STUMIERG, op. cit. stpra note 18, at 431 et seq. To the same effect, see Swabenland, supra
note 21, at 440 et seq.
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movables, courts generally seem to apply the law of the state with which the trust
has the most substantial connection.57
Relevant to possibilities for conflict avoidance in this area is the New York statute
quoted above, which permits the settlor to direct that the "effect of such trust""'8 as
well as its validity be determined by New York law, and which has been construed
to mean that the trust's interpretation shall be governed by New York law. 0 While
authority for the proposition is sparse, it would seem reasonable to allow a settlor
to specify the jurisdiction under whose laws the indenture should be interpreted-
just as, as has been suggested, he may specify the jurisdiction under whose laws its
validity should be determined. In fact, there do not seem to be public policy con-
siderations militating against the former, as might be the case with the latter.10
Furthermore, since the settlor may stipulate in the indenture all the rules of interpre-
tation he wishes, even to the point of reciting the laws of a given state, no contact
between the elements of the trust and the jurisdiction whose law is chosen would
appear to be necessary.
To avoid a conflict over construction, then, as to avoid a conflict over validity,"' a
settlor should concentrate as many elements of a trust as possible in the specific state
whose law he wishes to govern the interpretation of the indenture. An alternative
arrangement, inconvenient because of the lengthy indenture that may be entailed,
would be specification of the canons of construction desired, selected from the laws of
any given state or states. This technique may be the only feasible one, however,
where practical difficulties militate against a sufficient concentration of important ele-
ments of the trust within a chosen state.
But after an inter vivos trust of movables has been created, with considerable
foresight perhaps having been exercised in order to avoid a conflict of laws over in-
terpretation of the indenture, elements of the trust may be dispersed by circumstances
from the single state in which the settlor had concentrated them. Of course, if the
indenture either specifies the law of the state by which it is to be construed or has
set out in detail the rules for its interpretation, such a dispersal may, have minimal
effect. If, however, the settlor has relied solely on a concentration of elements of the
trust in a particular state whose law he wished to govern its construction, the ques-
tion then arises as to whether a conflict of laws may, nevertheless, be avoided and the
sbtdor's wish effectuated.
"LAND, op. dit. supra note 5, at 19 o . Cf. Commissioner v. Brown, x22 F. 2d 8oo (3d Cir. 1941)
(predominant contacts with New York, whose law governed); Clark v. Continental National Bank, 88
F. Supp. 324 (D. Neb. 1949) (settlor, trustee, rcs in Nebraska; beneficiaries elsewhere; Nebraska law
governed); In re Backeland's Will, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (settlor nonresident, rest of
elements in New York, whose law governed); In re Gaffney's Trust, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 675 (Sup. Ct.
1948) (stipulation that New York law was to govern); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Brunton, 74 N. Y. S. 2d
254 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (law of place of predominant contacts governed).
" N. Y. PaRS. PROP. LAW §1r2-a, note 34 supra.
"In re Ash's Trust, iii N. Y. S. 2d 115 (Sup. Ct. i952); In re Tabbagh's Estate, 167 Misc. 156,
3 N. Y. S. ad 542 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (testamentary trust applying similar N. Y. DECEDENT'S EST. LAW
§47).
"0 See cases cited note 33 supra. ", Cf. cases cited note 37 supra.
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Let us take, for example, the following case: A settor, domiciled in New Jersey,
has established an inter vivos trust of movables in New York, where he has executed
the indenture, has turned over to a New York trust company and a New York dom-
iciliary as co-trustees securities previously kept in a safe deposit box in New York,
and has named as beneficiaries his two sons, both New York domiciliaries. At this
point, the only connection the trust has with any state other than New York is the
fact that the settdor is a New Jersey domiciliary, and it is believed that New York
law would clearly be applicable to the construction of the indenture 2
Modifying the example somewhat, however, suppose that the two sons now move
to California to live, and the individual co-trustee moves to Connecticut. Will these
changes frustrate the intent of the settlor that New York law govern the trust's con-
struction? Probably not, since the cases indicate that after the creation of an inter
vivos trust of movables, the courts will still construe the indenture in accordance
with the law of the state with which, at the time of creation, the trust had the most
substantial connectionP3 Yet, it is possible that Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilming-
ton Trust Co., although dealing with the question of validity rather than construction,
may be some authority to the contrary, at least where the indenture envisaged some
shift, in view of its broad language:64
There is no substantial reason why a donor, in dealing with that which is his own,
may not provide for a change in the location of his trust with a consequent shifting of
the controlling law. In an era of economic uncertainty, with vanishing returns from
investments and with tax laws approaching confiscation, such a provision would seem to
amount to no more than common foresight and prudence.
C. The Administration of Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables
Administration of a trust usually refers to such things as the activities of the
trustee, the investment policy he follows, allocation of principal and income, the
accounting by the trustee, and the right of termination by the beneficiary.65 That the
administration of a trust may be subject to the law of a different jurisdiction than the
one governing its construction is suggested by Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., where the corpus had been moved from New York to Delaware:66
... the home of the trust was in this State, and, being subject then to local law, the
validity and effect of his deed of appointment and of the rights and interests of the ap-
pointees thereunder are to be adjudged by the law of Delaware.
Other cases point in the same direction,6 T although decisions continue to appear which
12 Cf. In re Baekeland's Will, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (Sup. Ct. r953).
03 E.g., Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471, go N. E. 816 (igiO) (life beneficiary moved to another
state); Cary v. Carman, s16 Misc. 463, i9o N. Y. Supp. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (life beneficiary moved;
successor trustee possibly in different state). But cf. Curtis v. Curtis, x85 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y.
Supp. 103 (ist Dep't 1918).
CA 24 A. 2d at 314.
O See RErrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §297, comment a (1934).
6 24 A. 2d at 314.
OTE.g., Estate of Cornelia V. N. Bedford, 96 N. Y. L. J. 1879 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Leach, x68 Misc. 526, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1938); MacMillan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
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hold that the laws of the same jurisdiction must necessarily govern both construction
and administration. 8
To say that the law of the situs governs the administration of a trust settles very
little in the typical conflicts case, where the distribution of elements of the trust
among a number of states makes ascertainment of the situs problematical. Here
the Restatement suggests that69
• . . consideration is given to the provisions of the instrument, the residence of the
trustees, the residence of the beneficiaries, the location of the property, the place where
the business of the trust is to be carried on.
Professor Beale agrees that"°
All matters of administration are determined by the law of the situs or seat of a
trust. The situs of a trust must be determined by an interpretation of the words by which
the trust is created ... all indications are considered, such as the intention of the parties,
the place of business or domicil of the trustee, the location of the trust res, and similar
matters.
To Professor Cavers,7' the choice of the law governing administration is simple
where there is a corporate trustee-namely, the state where it operates,)2 which is
likely to be the same law as governs validity anyway. And another writer offers a
comprehensive list of the elements on whose location courts have relied in de-
termining the proper law governing administration :73
i. The domicil of the creator of the trust.
2. The place in which the trust deed was executed.
3. The language of the trust instrument.
4. The place of probate of the will.
5. The location of the trust property.
6. The domicil of the trustee.
7. The domicil of the beneficiary.
8. The place in which the business of the trust is carried on.
9. The intention of the creator. [Footnotes omitted.]
To Judge Goodrich, while the intention of the settlor will be followed if stated,
the place with which the trust has its "most substantial connection" ' 4 will be
the situs; but, he cautiously adds: "The decisions seem not inconsistent with this
221 N. C. 352, 20 S. E. 2d 276 (1942); Application of Griswold, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
:'E.g., MacMillan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 221 N. C. 352, 20 S. E. 2d 276 (1942).
' RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAWS §297, comment d (1934).
70 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note so, at 1024. Cf. In re Lowman's Trust, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) (Ohio settlor, trustee, and corpus in New York; New York law governs).
' Cavers, supra note 14, at 19o.
7" But see GILBERT T. STEPHENSON, RIGHTS OF OUT-OF-STATE TRUST INSTITUTIONS (Trust Div., Amer-
ican Bankers Ass'n, 1944), and White, Need for Reciprocity on Rights of Out-of-State Trust Instii,,tions,
Trust Bull., Dec. 1951, p. 3 for implications that this may not always be so simple where a trust company
administers a trust established in another state.
" Swabenland, supra note 21, at 442-43.
"' GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note i6, at 493.
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view."75 Professor Stumberg feels, with the Restatement, that the law of the situs
should govern administration but offers no help in determining the situs for this
purpose and on the Restatement rule comments: 7
There are cases which might be construed as so holding, but their language is fre-
quently such as to indicate an intention to disregard the law of the place of administration
as such.
Walter W. Land has also assembled a list of the elements of a trust whose con-
nection with various states has been considered by courts in determining the law
governing its administration,7 but, as a Canadian writer plaintively has observed:
"No court appears to have listed in order of their importance the factors that should
be considered."' 8
Thus, there does seem to be general agreement among these authorities that the
intent of the settlor, expressed in the indenture, that the law of a given state govern
administration will be followed; 9 and that a predominance of the elements of a
trust in one state will subject administration of the trust to the law of that state.
More difficult, however, is the decision where the elements of a trust are more or
less equally divided among several states; here, the courts must decide which ele-
ments of the trust are the most significant-and the domicile of the settlor, the
domicile of the trustee, especially a corporate trustee, place of execution of the trust
agreement, and location of the corpus are those that have emerged.
As a conflict avoidance mechanism again, the New York statute discussed above"
is sufficiently broad to enable a settlor to subject the trust to New York law where
either the corpus or trustee is within the state. New York cases, both before8" and
after82 the statute, have permitted the settlor thus to prescribe the law to govern
administration of the trust. And the more elaborate Rhode Island statute s3 permits
the administration of a trust under Rhode Island law (i) where the trust is to be
administered in Rhode Island and the corpus is in Rhode Island when the trust is
created; (2) when it is to be administered in Rhode Island and at least one trustee
is a resident of Rhode Island or a Rhode Island corporation; or (3) when the settlor
is a Rhode Island resident. Accordingly, to avoid a conflict of laws governing
administration where the trust is to be administered in or the settlor is a resident of
Rhode Island, or where either the corpus or the trustee is in New York, the settlor
"Ibid.
" STUMtBn.RG, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 435.
77 LAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 231-34.
" Hoar, Some Aspects of Trusts in the Conflict of Laws, 26 CAN. B. Rav. 1415, 1424 (1948).
"E.g., Greims v. Bankers Trust Co., 124 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Application of Spitz-
muller, 279 App. Div. 233, xog N. Y. S. 2d i (1st Dep't 1951).
0 N. Y. PEaS. PROP. LAw § I2-a, note 34 supra.
" E.g., Matter of Morton, 129 Misc. 875, 224 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
'" E.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. 2d 792 (1937); Matter of Vanneck, 158
Misc. 704, 286 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Tabbagh, 167 Misc. 156, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 542
(Surr. Ct. 1938) (testamentary trust).
" R. I. GEN. LAws c. 486 (1938), as amended by R. I. Acts and Resolves 1941, c. 977, adding new
§§23, 24 (194), note 34 supra.
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need merely comply with the respective statutes by expressly stating that either New
York or Rhode Island law is to govern administration. And even in those states lack-
ing a similar statute, it seems that an express intent stated in the trust agreement will
prevail. 4
If, for any reason, it is inexpedient expressly to indicate this intent, however, the
same result can be achieved by grouping as many elements of the trust as is possible
in the state whose law is desired to govern. To rely unquestioningly on expectations
that a court will find an implied intent that a given state's law governs administra-
tion, however, is to hope too much; here courts may unexpectedly reach different
results.
After creation of the trust, however, a number of decisions state emphatically that
such shifts of elements of an inter vivos trust of movables as change of domicile by
the donor, 5 by the beneficiary,"8 and by the trustee," and moving the corpus to
another states will not change the law governing administration of the trust. Ac-
cording to this view, the law governing its administration becomes fixed at the cre-
ation of the trust, and, regardless of any change, the applicable law will remain the
same.
But not all states take this position. In Connecticut, for example, a statute spe-
cifically provides that when a nonresident becomes life beneficiary of a Connecticut
trust with a child who is remainderman, the life beneficiary may have a new trustee
appointed in the state of his residence, and the latter may bring a proceeding in
Connecticut for the delivery of the corpus to him.' While the statute makes no
mention of what law shall govern administration and no cases consider this point,
the state to which the corpus is removed would seem to be justified in apply-
ing its law to the administration of a trust where the setdor had not specified the
law that was to govern. The Connecticut statute might be construed as an ex-
pression of unconcern over the trust by the state once the corpus had been duly
delivered to the extrastate successor trustee.
In a number of other states, there are decisions indicating that shifts in the loca-
tion of the elements of a trust will change the law that is to govern its administration,
8 See, e.g., Codman v. Krell, 152 Mass. 214, 25 N. E. 90 (189o); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass.
235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920); Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, 25
F. 2d 493 (D. Mass. 1928).
" E.g., Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 5o (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1904); Tudor v. Vail, 195 Mass, 18,
8o N. E. 590 (907); Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, xx6 N. E. 549 (1917).
"E.g., Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 501 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1904); Codman v. Krell, 152 Mass.
214, 25 N. E. 9o (x89o); Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471, 90 N. E. 861 (igo); Farnum v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., 87 N. J. Eq. io8, 99 At. 145 (Ch. 19x6), afld, 87 N. J. Eq. 652, iox Ad. 1053 (1917);
Fell v. McCready, 236 App. Div. 390, 259 N. Y. Supp. 512 (4 th Dep't 1932), ag'd, 263 N. Y. 602,
189 N. E. 78 (933); Lewis v. County of Chester, 6o Pa. 325 (r869).
"'E.g., Lewis v. County of Chester, 6o Pa. 325 (1869); Swetland v. Swedland, io5 N. J. Eq. 6o8, 149
At. 50 (Ch. 1930), afl'd, 107 N. J. Eq. 504, 154 Ati. 907 (93).
"E.g., Farmers and Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Brewer, 27 Conn. 6oo (1858); First National
Bank v. National Broadway Bank, i56 N. Y. 459, 51 N. E. 398 (1898).
so CNN. GEN. STAT. §6895 (1949). See also id. §6862, Removal by foreign guardian of ward's
personal property, and §6863, Removal by foreign guardian of proceeds of sale of ward's real estate.
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at least where the trust agreement itself is silent on the subject. Typically, in a
recent case in which the situs of a trust was changed from New York to California,
the court observed -90
The holding that the situs of this trust may be transferred to a sister state without
offending our policy gives the trust mobility instead of rigidity. In these days, when inter
vivos trusts are created with ever growing frequency, when State lines are crossed so
easily and people maintain contacts in several States, a sympathetic approach to problems
of this sort is more likely to lead to the effectuation of the true intent of the creator of the
trust.
The difficulty faced by counsel, then, in drafting an indenture is that while he
can ordinarily select the state in which administration will be initiated, he can
scarcely predict whether unexpected shifts in the location of elements of the trust
will result in bringing its administration within the purview of a court that will
continue to apply the same law. Accordingly, it would seem- essential that this
contingency be recognized and that an appropriate clause be inserted in the indenture.
Such a clause might provide that the law of a given state should govern the trust's
administration, 3vherever its elements might be located; or, on the other hand, pro-
vision might specifically be made for applying the law of a state to which such a
shift might move the trust. The flexibility of the latter technique has some advan-
tage in that it may enable a trust to escape a jurisdiction whose legislation, especially
tax legislation, has become unduly burdensome.
Where a trustee changes the location of elements of the trust, typically his own
domicile and the corpus of the trust, in order to violate the terms of the trust agree-
ment, however, it seems clear that he cannot obtain any advantage that the different
rules of administration of the second state might otherwise afford. Jurisdiction to call
him to account exists in the courts of the second state"' where the law of the first
state would measure the trustee's conduct, and it has even been held that a judgment
against a dishonest trustee in the first state, obtained on substituted service, will be
supported by the full faith and credit clause" in the courts of the state to which an
absconding trustee has fled. 3
III
CONCLUSION
Because legislative rules for resolving the conflict of laws are rare, and, in any
case, their fashioning must properly form a part of comprehensive conflict-of-laws
legislation, counsel seeking to avoid a conflict of laws in inter vivos trusts of movables
must examine and seek to utilize the principally judge-made rules now in use.
The law governing the creation of inter vivos trusts does not permit great pre-
0 Matter of Matthiessen, 195 Misc. 598, 6o6, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
o, See, e.g., Equitable Trust Co. v. Schwebel, 40 F. Supp. 112 (E. D. Pa. 1941) (delinquent trustee
enjoined, however, to submit to jurisdiction of first state).
'2U. S. CoNsr. art. IV, §x.
"Boone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 163 F. 2d 8o (D. C. Cir. 5947) (testamentary trust).
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dictability, but any express statement in the trust agreement as to the law intended
to govern is likely to be respected by the courts, provided some element of the trust
impinges on the state whose law is specified. If, however, the law of the designated
state contravenes the public policy of the forum, it may not prevail. If the settlor's
intent is undiscernible, various states may test validity of the trust by the law of his
domicile, by the law of the situs of the corpus, or by the law of the state with which
the trust has the most substantial contacts. Furthermore, if the location of elements
of the trust shifts after its creation, some states will look to the law of the successor
state to determine its validity. Faced with this uncertainty, the wisdom of specifying
in the indenture the law intended to govern validity of a trust is clear.
When a trust has been properly established, the law governing its construction,
again, will usually be that specified in the indenture; and if none is specified, the
courts tend to apply the law of the state with which the trust is predominantly re-
lated. Here, again, counsel can avoid conflicts by specifying the law that is to
govern construction; and the possibility of a shift in the location of elements of the
trust to another state can be dealt with by a statement as to the law to govern in that
event.
While courts have not always been meticulous in distinguishing between what
are problems of construction and what are problems of administration, counsel can
state in the indenture that what are found to be questions of its administration shall
be governed by a specified law, not necessarily the law governing its validity or
construction. If this step is neglected, courts will follow the procedure of applying
the law of the state having predominant contacts with the trust, often an unpredict-
able matter where there are elements of the trust scattered among several states.
There seems to be more leeway in the area of administration of trusts (as compared
with validity or construction), which permits application of a different law if the
trust moves to another state; courts seem to be willing to apply the law of the forum
after a shift occurs. Covering the possibility of such a shift by a provision in the
trust agreement should help effectuate the settlor's intent with respect to the law
intended to govern administration of the trust.
One of the most perplexing conflict problems facing lawyers drafting trust agree-
ments has, of necessity, been ignored. Although suggestions have been offered to
relate a given trust to a selected state for various purposes and even to provide for
shifts to other states, no help can be given in foreseeing what state laws in the
future will be advantageous or disadvantageous. For that problem the most cun-
ning draftsman has only his crystal ball.
